Russia Boosts Weapons Production Using Technology from Ukraine's Allies – Olena Yurchenko for United24

16:02, 30.09.2024
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In an article titled "Russia Boosts Weapons Production Using Technology from Ukraine's Allies," United24 Media explores the critical dependence of Russia’s military industry on imported CNC (computer numerical control) machines. Olena Yurchenko, senior analyst at Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU), highlighted the importance of these technologies for the aggressor's defense sector. 

“These machines are essential for manufacturing components for nearly all modern weaponry — from artillery barrels and shells to turbine parts for rocket engines and even nuclear weapons,” Yurchenko said. 

She also emphasized that Russia’s defense industry is the primary consumer of high-tech CNC machinery. According to ESCU data, out of 210 analyzed Russian importers, at least 190 have been working with or continue to collaborate with defense-related enterprises. 

The CNC machines delivered to Russia are usually made in China using Western technology. Notably, 13 out of 16 major Chinese CNC manufacturers that have exported to Russia maintain close ties with countries in the sanctions coalition. They import high-tech components, establish research centers in Germany and Japan, and form partnerships or subsidiaries in Europe. 

Today, the direct supply of CNC machines to Russia is prohibited, yet Moscow successfully circumvents sanctions by using intermediary companies from China, Turkey, the UAE, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Therefore, the ESCU recommends Ukraine’s allies strengthen regulations, including:  

  • Approve and publish a list of equipment (tools, spare parts, technical fluids, and software) subject to enhanced export control. 
  • Prohibit the re-export of such equipment to Russia, Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. 
  • Standardize enhanced inspection procedures for supplies to jurisdictions at risk of sanctions circumvention. 
  • Require manufacturers and sellers of machines to include a clause prohibiting re-export to Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and extend such obligations to plants located in third countries. 
  • Require manufacturers to install GPS trackers and remote control systems. 
  • Require manufacturers to investigate cases of their equipment being supplied to Russia and publish the results of such investigations. 
  • Extend restrictions to plants in third countries and production facilities that use trademarks and/or operate under license. 
  • Extend restrictions and regulations to the used equipment market. 
  • Increase liability for sanctions violations, including negligence that led to such violations (without intent). 
  • Ensure greater involvement of banks through transaction checks (similar to combating money laundering and terrorism financing, AML/CFT). 
  • Introduce a whistle-blowing mechanism to obtain insider information on violations. 
  • Share information and coordinate efforts with other countries. 

For more details on the collaboration between Moscow and Beijing, you can refer to the full ESCU report “Third-best option: ESCU’s new report on China’s role in Russian maintained access to critical industrial equipment.”